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ABSTRACT The hubris tradition of  research has been criticized for limiting its scope by associat-
ing hubris predominantly with detrimental leadership behaviours. To counteract this bias, we 
provide a more nuanced exploration of  hubris and consider both beneficial and detrimental 
manifestations of  hubris in start-up founders’ leadership behaviours. Our analysis, based on 
qualitative data from expert interviews and two case studies, indicates that, whilst hubristic start-
up founders are likely to fail overall, they also excel in creating and communicating visionary 
scenarios, steering employees through critical situations, and extracting commitment from third 
parties. These under-researched ‘bright’ manifestations of  hubris allow start-up founders to lead 
their venture towards a stage, in which their visionary power and resilience become crucial pre-
requisites for economic progress. Our findings extend knowledge on hubristic leadership, offer 
new directions for the hubris tradition of  research, and open up avenues for future research with 
a more balanced view of  hubris.
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INTRODUCTION
‘I thought, nobody is going to be crazy enough to do space, so I’d better do space’. 
(Elon Musk[1])
‘We’re here to put a dent in the universe. Otherwise why else even be here?’. (Steve 
Jobs[2])
‘When I’m told absolutely no, it’s a definite maybe’. (Dean Kamen[3])
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Processes of  ‘creative destruction’ in the Schumpeterian sense have often been initiated 
by start-up founders who set out to actively shape the future rather than merely antic-
ipate changes (Hayward et al., 2010; Maccoby, 2000; Ranft and O’Neill, 2001). These 
godlike ambitions are interpreted in reference to Greek mythology as driven by hubris, 
a rather abnormal psychological disposition particularly pronounced in leaders (Claxton 
et al., 2015; Trumbull, 2010). Hubristic leaders are biased by a grandiose belief  in their 
talents and abilities, which they express through high levels of  self-confidence, exagger-
ated pride, overinflated positive self-evaluations, and arrogance (Judge et al., 2009; Owen 
and Davidson, 2009; Petit and Bollaert, 2012). The ‘hubris theory of  entrepreneurship’ 
suggests that hubris is particularly prevalent in start-up contexts, as it supports founders 
to enact their seemingly far-fetched plans despite facing high levels of  failure rates, time 
constraints and uncertainty (Hayward et al., 2006). These ‘bright’ effects of  hubris on 
leadership emergence are, however, rarely reflected in research on leadership effective-
ness, which is primarily focused on the determination of  hubris’ ‘dark’ manifestations in 
leadership behaviours: excessive risk-taking (Hodgkinson and Partington, 2008; Li and 
Tang, 2010); flawed, subjective assessments of  decisions (McManus, 2016; Mishina et al., 
2010); and strategic persistency (Chowdhury, 2014; Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). The 
only exception is a more recent study by Tang et al. (2015a) who found that hubristic 
leaders are drivers of  firm innovation.
Research in this area has been recently criticized for its limited scope, particularly 
with regard to the inherent association of  hubris with detrimental leadership behaviours 
(Bollaert and Petit, 2010; Judge et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2015b). This research bias has 
resulted in the literature to date lacking holistic and impartial investigations of  how hu-
bris is manifested across core leadership behaviours (Judge et al., 2009; Picone et al., 
2014). This is surprising as similar shortcomings have long been addressed in literature 
on narcissistic leadership (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Maccoby, 2000; Rosenthal 
and Pittinsky, 2006), and the examples of  the three successful start-up founders referred 
to above should invite closer investigations into a more rounded approach to research-
ing hubris in start-up leaders. Whilst the ventures of  all three of  these founders have at 
times teetered on the verge of  failure due to spectacular misjudgements of  markets and 
stubborn resistance to criticism on their part, they have also had the courage to realize 
their visions for highly innovative and disruptive business ideas, which more conservative 
founders would rather not have pursued (Hayward, 2007; Picone et al., 2014). Crucially, 
their success rested on their ability to persuade investors and employees to provide re-
sources, without which the exploitation of  their far-fetched ideas would not have been 
possible (Hayward et al., 2010; Ranft and O’Neill, 2001).
These observations could entail two interesting, yet hypothetical, implications for the 
hubris tradition of  research. First, it seems feasible that hubristic founders succeed in 
certain leadership matters, particularly those involving the conception of  visionary, po-
tentially disruptive scenarios and their enactment through the extraction of  commitment 
from third parties, while failing in others (Bollaert and Petit, 2010; Hayward, 2007; Judge 
et al., 2009). Second, whilst the three cases do not disprove the higher failure rate of  hu-
bristic founders, they do indicate that ‘such failure is not necessarily bad for ventures and 
entrepreneurial activity’ (Hayward et al., 2006, p. 170). On the contrary, hubristic found-
ers seem to be able to lead their ventures towards a stage, in which their visionary power 
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and persistence are crucial prerequisites for economic progress (Alvarez and Busenitz, 
2001; Bollaert and Petit, 2010; Judge et al., 2009; Sarasvathy, 2000). Inspired by these 
observations, we aim to examine the effectiveness of  hubristic leadership more compre-
hensively, considering both beneficial and detrimental manifestations. Owing to the early 
state of  research in this regard, we adopt an explorative research design in which the 
effects of  hubristic leadership are examined through an analysis of  experts’ narratives, 
and two case studies of  hubristic leaders in a start-up context.
Against this background, we contribute to literature on entrepreneurial leadership in 
general, and to studies on the effectiveness of  hubristic leadership in particular: we are 
among the first to provide empirical evidence for the ambivalent manifestations of  hubris 
in the leadership behaviours of  start-up founders, especially in the early stage of  venture 
creation. This aspect of  our findings allows to broaden the scope of  the ‘hubris theory 
of  entrepreneurship’ by showing that the ‘bright’ effects of  hubris go beyond leadership 
emergence and are also crucial to leadership effectiveness. Indeed, our evidence suggests 
that hubristic entrepreneurs perform well not only in the initial venture creation process, 
but their leadership approach is also critical to subsequent roles such as initiating and 
communicating visionary scenarios, steering employees through critical situations, and 
securing commitment from third parties. With these contributions, our study provides 
the basis for generating practical implications, which can help investors, employees and 
other stakeholders mitigate detrimental outcomes of  hubristic leadership while encour-
aging beneficial ones.
Our paper is structured as follows. First, we review literature on hubristic leadership, 
introduce the conceptual background, and develop our theoretical framework. In the 
third section, we present our methodological approaches which informed our research 
and analysis. The fourth section presents our findings. In our concluding section, we 
draw out the theoretical and practical implications of  our study, consider the limitations 
of  our research, and highlight avenues for future research.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Hubristic Leaders’ Psychological Disposition
Research projects on hubristic leadership have long been confronted with conceptual 
inconsistencies resulting from the different interpretations of  hubristic acts identified 
in Greek mythology (Bollaert and Petit, 2010; Chowdhury, 2014). These conceptual 
challenges have impeded the comparability of  research findings and hindered the un-
ambiguous differentiation of  hubris from related but overall independent psychologi-
cal dispositions, such as overconfidence and narcissism (Petit and Bollaert, 2012; Picone 
et al., 2014). Bollaert and Petit (2010) have recently addressed these issues by tracing the 
origins of  hubris within the tradition of  abnormal psychology that focuses on ‘unusual’ 
psychological patterns (Alloy et al., 2005). According to the understanding in this dis-
cipline, hubris is a temporary psychological disposition that is triggered by individual 
power and characterized by various cognitive and personality dimensions (Claxton et al., 
2015). Cognitive processes of  hubristic leaders are biased by their sense of  grandiosity, 
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and an exaggerated belief  in their own talents and abilities (Judge et al., 2009; Owen 
and Davidson, 2009). Their overinflated self-perception impacts on their decision- 
making that deviates from conventional rationale and normative standards (Hayward 
et al., 2006; Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). To that end, hubristic leaders tend to rely on 
their ‘unbridled intuition’ (Claxton et al., 2015, p. 68), instead of  processing and ana-
lysing rational arguments, and remain unchallenged in so doing.[4] In addition to these 
less obvious cognitive processes, hubristic leaders display various characteristic person-
ality traits, such as high levels of  self-confidence, exaggerated pride, overinflated positive 
self-evaluations, and arrogance (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Judge et al., 2009; Petit 
and Bollaert, 2012).
In contrast to the enduring and inflexible characteristics of  narcissism, hubris is seen 
as a temporary condition that affects individuals only while they are in a position of  
power (Russell, 2011; Tang et al., 2018; Trumbull, 2010). In particular, hubristic leaders 
do not display the characteristics typical of  narcissistic personalities, such as a preoccu-
pation with the self, a sense of  entitlement, and a continuous, excessive pursuit of  admi-
ration (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007).
One of  the difficulties in operationalizing the complex manifestations of  hubris is 
that it is often equated with the more established and readily operationalized concept 
of  overconfidence. While both concepts share certain characteristics, hubris is a rather 
extreme and even ‘abnormal’ form of  more common overconfidence that is widely pro-
nounced among individuals regardless of  their status of  power (Hiller and Hambrick, 
2005; Owen, 2006).
Hubris in Leadership Contexts
The research interest in examining hubris from a leadership perspective was triggered 
by Roll (1986), who was one of  the first to open the ‘black box’ of  executive psychology 
for leadership research (Hayward, 2007). Roll argues that hubristic decision-makers in 
M&A processes tend to pay excessive premiums that yield zero returns as they overes-
timate their ability to generate value from the acquisition. Numerous empirical studies 
provide confirmatory evidence for his ‘hubris hypothesis of  corporate takeovers’ (see, for 
example, Dubofsky and Fraser, 1989; Hodgkinson and Partington, 2008; Ismail, 2005). 
These advances have encouraged scholars from other disciplines to examine the rele-
vance of  hubris for distinct leadership matters. Studies focusing on as diverse cases as 
the presidency of  influential politicians (Owen, 2006), Napoleon’s March from Moscow 
(Kroll et al., 2000), or the project management of  Heathrow’s Terminal 5 (Brady and 
Davies, 2010) provide evidence that hubris leads executives to neglect important issues, 
be it environmental circumstances or operational concerns. In addition, they are found 
to promote risk-taking in firms (Li and Tang, 2010), corporate illegality (Mishina et al., 
2010), the misuse of  human, social and financial capital (Haynes et al., 2015; McManus, 
2016), corporate social irresponsibility (Tang et al., 2015b), and financial misreporting 
(Cormier et al., 2016). The only bright manifestation of  hubris has been considered 
more recently by Tang et al. (2015a) who found that hubris also has positive impacts on 
firm innovation.
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Recent reviews of  existing evidence reveal considerable weaknesses in the hubris tra-
dition of  research that impede further theoretical advances. For instance, Picone et al. 
(2014) criticize the existing literature as tending to ‘look at some trees and miss the whole 
forest’ (p. 448). The authors refer to the lack of  a comprehensive framework that al-
lows to holistically capture the effects of  hubris on leadership matters more broadly. 
Also Bollaert and Petit (2010) emphasize the necessity of  such a framework as it would 
support scientists to look beyond the ‘dark’ side of  hubris instead of  being ‘caught in a 
negative–negative paradigm in which they seek to identify pathological psychological 
characteristics in top executives and link them to poor performance effects or other disas-
trous consequences’ (p. 363). In fact, existing research fails to acknowledge that particular 
personality traits of  any psychological disposition are likely to have both upsides and 
downsides (Furnham et al., 2012; Judge et al., 2009; Resick et al., 2009). Put differently, 
they ‘can be considered as trade-offs, with a particular trait producing not unalloyed ad-
vantage but a mixture of  costs and benefits’ (Nettle, 2006, p. 625). Following this, Judge 
et al (2009) argue that, as part of  the ‘dark’ manifestations of  hubris, hubristic leaders 
might neglect strategic concerns, whereas their tendency to project power, strength, and 
authority in difficult situations suggests the possible ‘bright’ effects of  hubris.
All of  these insights have been generated with a focus on hubristic executives in es-
tablished organizations while empirical findings with regard to the manifestations of  
hubris in start-up founders’ leadership behaviours is still scarce (Bollaert and Petit, 2010; 
Picone et al., 2014). We address this gap by developing and drawing upon a theoretical 
framework that allows us to comprehensively explore manifestations of  hubris across 
core leadership behaviours that are performed by start-up founders.
Start-up Founders as Leaders
Baron and Shane (2007) define entrepreneurship as ‘a field of  business [that] seeks to un-
derstand how opportunities to create something new arise and are discovered or created 
by specific persons, who then use various means to exploit or develop them, thus, produc-
ing a wide range of  effects’ (p. 5). This definition attributes a leadership role to start-up 
founders that goes beyond the management of  a company as it involves the exploration 
and exploitation of  business opportunities (Cogliser and Brigham, 2004; Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996). Schumpeter (1934) characterizes entrepreneurship as a special case of  
leadership that encompasses the creation of  a new venture. Building on that, numerous 
studies have aimed to explore the leadership behaviours of  new venture founders in a 
more differentiated and balanced way (Ensley et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2004; Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000). To the best of  our knowledge, however, literature still lacks a com-
prehensive framework of  core leadership behaviours that are crucial to the realization of  
venture creation processes.
A typology of  relevant leadership behaviours for start-up founders needs to reflect the 
specificity of  start-up contexts, in that the lack of  well-defined governance structures 
and work processes entail only low impediments to leadership and the exercise of  power 
(Ensley et al., 2006; Hmieleski and Ensley, 2007; Kerr and Jermier, 1978; Sathe, 2007). 
At the same time, start-up founders cannot rely on historical trends or previous perfor-
mance levels as a basis for their decision-making processes (Miller, 1983). Hence, they 
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are confronted with and need to handle considerably higher levels of  uncertainty and 
complexity compared to executives in established organizations (Busenitz and Barney, 
1997; Ensley et al., 2006; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). These conditions favour the 
occurrence of  decision biases, such as hubris, as reflected in decision-making processes 
that deviate from conventionally perceived rational and normative standards (Hiller and 
Hambrick, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2000). Their hubris emerges once founders have taken the 
decision to invest their time and other resources in the exploration and exploitation of  
innovation potentials, and supports them in carrying out their plans despite the high 
levels of  uncertainty and complexity that start-up founders typically face (Hayward 
et al., 2006).
During the analysis of  our data, it became evident that for a comprehensive examina-
tion of  the manifestations of  hubris in the start-up founders’ leadership behaviours, we 
needed a theoretical framework that holistically reflects the specificities of  the start-up 
context and the leadership behaviours necessary to cope with its conditions. To develop 
such a framework, we drew upon classical economic and entrepreneurship theories as 
they inform this paper’s underlying understanding of  what constitutes entrepreneurship 
(Baron and Shane, 2007; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). In particular, the classical 
literature contains important contributions which describe core functions that entrepre-
neurs need to perform to lead their ventures through the exploration and exploitation 
of  innovation potentials (see, for example, Casson, 1982; Kirzner, 1973; Knight, 1921; 
Schumpeter, 1934). Building on the seminal risk-taking function of  Cantillon (1755), 
several studies have been undertaken to generate a more diversified understanding of  
functions that start-up founders need to perform (see Hébert and Link, 1988). Barreto 
(1989) reviews these efforts to synthesize the scientific debate, and Freiling (2008) added a 
systematization of  the functions by pointing to their explorative or exploitative load. This 
endeavour resulted in the presentation of  four former stand-alone functions under the 
umbrella of  research on entrepreneurial functions, namely (1) innovation (Schumpeter, 
1934), (2) risk management (Knight, 1921), (3) (internal) coordination (Cole, 1949; 
Gartner, 1988) and (4) arbitrage (Kirzner, 1973; Mises, 1949). The innovation and 
risk-taking functions are explorative in nature. Specifically, entrepreneurs identify in-
novation potentials through the (re)combination of  products, processes, organizational 
structures, and business models, among others. These processes require them to develop 
a vision that clarifies business objectives for an uncertain future and serves as an inspira-
tion to team members, (potential) employees, investors and other parties who could sup-
port the venture creation process (Bryant, 2004; Cogliser and Brigham, 2004). Hence, 
leadership in this regard involves the creation of  ‘visionary scenarios that are used to 
assemble and mobilize a “supporting cast” of  participants who become committed by 
the vision to the discovery and exploitation of  strategic value creation’ (Gupta et al., 
2004, p. 242). This exploration of  innovation potentials requires entrepreneurs to absorb 
uncertainties through the performance of  the risk management function. This function 
involves the identification, evaluation, and handling of  risks (Knight, 1921). Leadership 
behaviours in this regard entail shouldering the burden of  responsibilities that sustains 
the actions of  these entrepreneurs’ followers (Gupta et al., 2004).
The other two functions of  our framework – internal coordination, and arbitrage – 
cover the exploitative part of  what constitutes entrepreneurship (Baron and Shane, 2007; 
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Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Internal coordination requires entrepreneurs to initi-
ate, maintain and aggrandize a profit-oriented business, and involves the coordination 
of  resources (Gartner, 1988). Leadership behaviours in this regard entail the coordina-
tion of  value-added activities and the initiation of  sense-making initiatives that serve 
as a guide to employees and foster their motivation (Cogliser and Brigham, 2004). The 
external counterpart to internal coordination is the arbitrage function which sits at the 
market interface (Kirzner, 1973; Mises, 1949) and involves the discovery and exploitation 
of  profit opportunities. This function requires an entrepreneur’s alertness and accumu-
lation of  knowledge of  supply sources, market conditions, and customer segments (Daily 
and Dalton, 1993). In terms of  leadership behaviours, entrepreneurs are required to 
cope with market uncertainties and environmental changes in order to guide collective 
commercialization efforts that are aligned to the overall vision of  the founders. In order 
to succeed in these matters, leaders have to secure commitment from external stake-
holders (Gupta et al., 2004), such as investors, network partners, and suppliers. All four 
of  the previously described entrepreneurial functions and related relevant leadership 
behaviours are summarized in Figure 1.
After the first rounds of  data analysis, we started to draw upon this comprehensive 
framework to overcome the limited scope of  the hubris tradition of  research (Bollaert 
and Petit, 2010; Picone et al., 2014) and organize our empirical data to generate answers 
to the following research question: How is hubris manifested across core leadership behaviours 
performed by start-up founders during the exploration and exploitation of  novel business opportunities?
METHODOLOGY
Methodological Considerations
Scholars who have recently assessed the state of  theory development within the hubris 
tradition of  research emphasize the necessity to generate more in-depth insights on the 
complex manifestations of  hubris in leadership matters through constructivist research 
approaches (Brennan and Conroy, 2013; Hill et al., 2014). With regard to the nascent 
state of  scientific knowledge on how hubris affects leadership behaviours in start-up con-
texts, scholars especially highlight the value of  letting new relationships emerge instead 
of  defining them prior to the data collection (Haynes et al., 2015). Such an approach, 
however, carries the difficulty of  overcoming the limited accessibility of  research subjects 
as individuals are generally less likely to participate in research projects, which explore 
their psychological disposition (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Cycyota and Harrison, 
2006; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Another challenge involved in determining hubris 
when relying on direct interaction with start-up founders instead of  numerical proxies is 
that it requires sufficient experience to distinguish hubristic from non-hubristic entrepre-
neurs. In order to overcome these challenges, Bollaert and Petit (2010) argue that ‘direct 
measures do not necessarily have to be collected from executives themselves. Using direct 
measures provided by the executive’s entourage could also be a way to get round the diffi-
culty of  accessing the top executive directly’ (p. 373). Following this suggestion, we tested 
and developed different research designs. Our primary study indicated that investors, 
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start-up consultants and coaches are able to reliably identify patterns of  hubris as they 
are experts in accompanying diverse founders over a longer period of  time. We therefore 
decided to draw upon their narratives to gain a micro-level understanding of  how hubris 
is manifested in start-up founders’ leadership behaviours (Boje, 2001; Fletcher, 2007; 
Giddens, 1994; Ogbor, 2000). In addition, we aimed to enrich our data by also under-
standing the hubristic entrepreneurs’ situations, values, meanings, motivations, and log-
ics that governed why they performed leadership behaviours in certain ways (Curran and 
Blackburn, 2000; Fletcher, 2007). This close-up approach allows us to fully understand 
the effects of  hubris on leadership effectiveness in a real-world context (Gummesson, 
2000; Yin, 2011).
Data Collection
Experts’ narratives. Narrative accounts of  inquiry allow to capture human experiences 
of  events, activities, and practices (O’Connor, 2002; Weick, 1995) and represent a 
‘fundamental way in which people compose meaning, inter-relate and connect to each 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework
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other’ (Fletcher, 2007, p. 653). In our study, we draw upon the narratives of  experts who 
were selected based on theoretical sampling (Strauss, 1987). The following criteria were 
applied to identify experts with sufficient expertise in dealing with new venture founders: 
they had to (1) have at least two years’ experience of  working in direct interaction with 
start-up founders, e.g., in an investing, consulting, or coaching role; (2) have worked with 
at least 30 start-up founders; and (3) operate within the start-up ecosystem in Berlin in 
order to ensure the comparability of  the overall conditions for experts and founders.
Based on the information they provided on LinkedIn, Crunchbase and personal web-
sites, we identified 150 experts who met these criteria (46 investors, 73 start-up consultants, 
and 31 coaches), and invited them to participate in a scientific study on entrepreneurial 
self-confidence. The experts had on average 9.3 years’ experience and had worked with 
83 start-up founders. Initially, ten agreed to participate in our study (between them, on 
average 8.9 years’ experience with 76 start-ups). Interviews were conducted with all ten. 
Through the interviews, we were able to identify additional interlocutors from the net-
works of  these experts. An additional 34 individuals were recommended on this basis, 
of  which 27 fulfilled all our criteria and were invited to participate. On this basis, we 
conducted a further 19 interviews until theoretical saturation was achieved (Glaser, 1978; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
The interviews were conducted in German, the majority in person (n = 23) and a 
few via telephone (n = 6), between June 2015 and August 2017. In preparation for the 
interview, the experts were asked to reflect upon their experiences with start-up founders 
who displayed the following characteristics: (1) exaggerated pride or self-confidence, (2) 
overinflated positive self-evaluation, and (3) arrogance. The interviews were unstructured 
and the term ‘hubris’ itself  was not used in order to avoid undesirable biases. The inter-
views started by asking the experts to describe in detail the specific venture creation pro-
cesses they had accompanied and that had been performed by founders who displayed 
the given characteristics (Gergen and Gergen, 1992; Watson, 2002). This unstructured 
approach gave respondents ample time to explain the importance of  their observations 
and to elaborate on what they thought of  as particularly important (Corbin and Morse, 
2003). The interviews took on average 1 hour and 23 minutes and were audio-recorded 
and transcribed verbatim.
We integrated two validity checks in our study in order to determine whether the ex-
perts had indeed observed hubris. First, we asked the experts to describe concrete occa-
sions in which they had observed manifestations of  exaggerated pride or self-confidence, 
overinflated positive self-evaluation, and arrogance in the start-up founders’ behaviours. 
Second, their descriptions were then assessed independently by two trained psychologists 
who both actively support university spin-offs in Berlin’s start-up ecosystem. Based on 
the interview transcripts, they rated the indications of  hubris in the experts’ descriptions 
as either ‘strong’, ‘rather strong’, ‘rather weak’ or ‘weak’. As a result of  their assessment, 
we excluded from the analysis two narratives in which the evidence of  hubris was con-
sidered ‘weak’ by both psychologists. Three further narratives, which were classified as 
‘rather weak’ by one of  the psychologists, were discussed in more detail and finally in-
cluded in the study. To triangulate this data, we additionally asked the experts to assess 
the perceived self-evaluations of  the founders they had described. For this purpose, we 
adapted the CSE-scale proposed by Hiller and Hambrick (2005) as a means to determine 
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hubris, and rephrased their 12 items to allow for peer-assessments of  the founders (e.g., 
‘the founder is confident to get the success he deserves in life’ or ‘overall the founder is 
satisfied with himself ’). The experts were asked to score their assessments on a 7-point-
Likert scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). All founders were consistently rated 
with very high values (M = 80.5), which is above the suggested threshold value of  76 as 
an indicator for hubris (Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). The final data set contained the 
narratives of  ten investors, 11 start-up consultants, and six start-up coaches, with an aver-
age of  almost 10 (9.43) years’ experience of  working with start-up founders. About 25 of  
the interviewed experts were men and two women. The narratives contain only one ref-
erence to a hubristic female entrepreneur, while all other founders described were male.
Case studies. In order to obtain a multiple perspective on how and especially why hubristic 
entrepreneurial leaders behave in certain ways, we complemented the experts’ narratives 
with in-depth case studies of  hubristic entrepreneurs. For this purpose, we identified 
three entrepreneurs who showed particularly striking manifestations of  hubris in the 
experts’ narratives and scored the highest values in the experts’ peer-assessments. We 
asked all three experts to establish contact with the founders they had described. One 
of  the consultants expressed concerns about jeopardizing his personal relationship with 
the founder. The other two experts, both investors, agreed and asked the two founders 
to participate in our study on ‘the importance of  self-confidence for venture creation 
processes’. The agreement of  two of  these founders enabled us to take a closer look at 
these, rather extreme, cases. We again relied on the narratives of  the two founders, who 
described their venture creation processes in detail. These unstructured interviews took 
on average 1 hour and 35 minutes and were complemented with two interviews of  their 
former employees, with an average of  50 minutes. In addition, the founders provided us 
with secondary data, such as internal documents, business plans, company presentations, 
and pitch videos. Table I presents all the primary and secondary data collected between 
June 2015 and January 2018.
Analytical Approach
In terms of  data analysis, we followed the Gioia methodology which offers a rigorous 
inductive approach to examining qualitative data (Gioia et al., 2013). All data were tran-
scribed and coded by using Atlas.ti software. We started by coding the first-order data that 
captures relevant words, phrases and descriptions. These ‘in-vivo’ concepts were close to 
the terms and language used by the experts, founders and their employees (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2014; van Maanen, 1979). The concepts were then grouped and merged into 
first-order categories to build the basis for a comparison of  the data in order to identify 
second-order themes (Gioia et al., 2013). These are theoretically informed, and involved 
an iterative processes of  going back and forth between the data and the related literature 
(Corley and Gioia, 2004; Glaser et al., 1968). In a final step, we linked these second-order 
themes to overarching aggregate dimensions. The data were coded separately by each 
member of  the research team in order to ensure intercoder reliability. The outcomes 
of  the initial and final coding process were discussed with a group of  eight scientists in 
two workshops, lasting three hours each. When we first started coding the data, we did 
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not have any specific framework or systematization in mind. However, during the first 
rounds of  data analysis we realized that the distinction between the conceptualization 
of  hubris and its manifestations was not always sufficiently clear. For this reason, and to 
avoid any confusion, we decided to classify the findings in accordance with the theoreti-
cal framework of  start-up founders’ core leadership behaviours as introduced above, i.e., 
innovation, internal coordination, arbitrage, and risk management.
Figure 2. Manifestations of  hubris in start-up founders’ leadership behaviours
1st Order Concepts 2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions
• A. Radical rather than incremental 
innovation are envisioned
• B. Persistence in the realization of once 
envisioned business ideas
1. Insistence on potentially disruptive 
visions
Visionary Perseverance
• C. Proof-of-concept and validation of 
value proposition is considered 
unnecessary
• D. Alternatives for and adaptations of 
envisioned innovation are neglected
2. Perceived self-evidence of value 
proposition
• E. External risks are neither anticipated 
nor appropriately considered
• F. Negligence of significant problems 
during business model implementation
• G. Perception of being resistant against 
external circumstances
• H. Consideration of illegal means to 
realize business models at all cost
3. Negligence of potential risks and 
emerging problems 
4. Perceived resilience drives 
business activities
Reckless Invulnerability
• I. Perceived grandiosity of targeted 
business model 
• J. Unshakable belief in being able to 
successfully establish their business 
model
• K. Excitement and persuasiveness is 
highly motivational for employees
• L. Targeted decision-making in critical 
situations
5. Unshakable belief in the success 
of the targeted business model




• M. Core tasks are rarely delegated
• N. Own decisions are enforced on 
employees
• O. Building excessive internal structures
7. Egocentrism in internal decision-
making 
• P. Persuasive initiation of strategic 
partnerships with external stakeholders 
that support commercialization efforts
• Q. Undertaking sensational marketing 
efforts
8. Persuasiveness and sensationalism 
in dealing with external stakeholders
Persuasive 
Unconventionality
• R. Negligence of experts’ feedback 
regarding commercialization strategies
• S. Commercialization strategies exceed 
own capabilities and are not aligned to 
market conditions
9. Insistence on unaligned 
commercialization strategies
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We present our findings separately for each of  the identified manifestations of  hubris 
in explorative and exploitative leadership behaviours. The figures and tables in each sec-
tion illustrate the emerging data structure and representative first-order data. All direct 
quotes presented below were first translated into English by the authors. To ensure the 
reliability of  the data after the statements had been translated, we asked a colleague who 
is a native speaker of  English and fluent in German to translate them back into German, 
which allowed us to compare and double check their meaning.
DATA ANALYSIS
Description of  Cases
Both cases are anonymized, and all the following information has been endorsed by each 
of  the respective founders.
Carl
Business model and value proposition. Carl’s ambition to launch a new venture was triggered 
by the UMTS license auctioning in 2000 that resulted in higher data transmission rates 
and offered considerable business opportunities for mobile application providers. He 
wanted to take advantage of  these developments and generated a dozen new business 
ideas. In the end, he decided to develop a mobile application that helps users prepare 
for their driving tests. The idea was based on his gut-feeling rather than having talked to 
his customers to validate his value proposition. His venture ‘DrivingTest’ was launched 
in Germany in 2003 shortly after he had turned 38, with Carl as the only shareholder 
who always had the final say. Although Carl had studied computer sciences, he only 
had minimal programming skills. He therefore employed five developers who were 
responsible for the technical realization of  his mobile application.
Previous experiences and network. ‘DrivingTest’ was Carl’s second venture after having 
launched his first mobile game start-up in 1996. That venture was still flourishing in 
the beginning of  2000, but he was looking for new challenges and wanted to start up a 
new venture from scratch. For the launch of  ‘DrivingTest’, he benefited from his prior 
experiences of  starting a business with more than 23 employees in the same industry. 
In addition, he had already established a business network that had contacts with 
competitors, such as Jamba, and key marketplace providers for mobile applications, 
such as Vodafone.
Financing and revenue streams. Carl initially bootstrapped his new venture and aimed to 
generate revenues from selling his mobile application. However, he was unwilling to sell 
‘DrivingTest’ for only 0.99 USD per downloaded application, which was the only price 
Vodafone accepted at that time. Carl initiated lengthy negotiations that took several 
months and, eventually, he succeeded in selling his mobile application for 9.99 USD in 
Vodafone’s marketplace.
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Outcome. Despite these achievements, the venture failed a year later after Carl had 
neglected major issues, not least the limited storage capacities and net data transmission 
rates of  the mobile phone technology at that time. The first version of  the mobile game 
contained far too many features which mobile phones were unable to process at that time. 
His developers needed another six months to adjust the application in order to generate 
a version that was functioning with the contemporary mobile phone technology. During 
that time, whilst Carl did not generate any profit, he still had to pay his developers’ salaries 
and the rent of  the rather large office space. Even when he was facing bankruptcy, he 
did not acknowledge his failure until his bank contacted him, and even then, at first, 
he believed that the bank had made a mistake. By the time the mobile application had 
become functional, Carl had run out of  funds for its commercialization. Unfortunately, 
it was already too late to start looking for another investor as he had dismissed all his 
employees in 2004 and liquidated the company. Nevertheless, the core idea of  the app 
was developed further by Carl’s developers who saw its potential and value in the rapidly 
evolving mobile games industry. The developers adapted crucial components of  ‘Driving 
Test’ in order to develop a comparable and fully functioning mobile application that was 
ranked among the best mobile games in Vodafone’s marketplace in 2006. In so doing, 
the developers addressed key issues that Carl had not considered previously when he was 
determined to launch the mobile application within only three months.
Marc
Business model and value proposition. In 1993, Marc launched a start-up which had an 
innovative radio station at the core of  his business model. His aim was to provide an 
alternative to existing mainstream music programs by targeting especially young listeners 
in their early 20s who embraced popular underground DJ-music. During the first two 
and a half  years, Marc employed three friends and collaborated with more than 30 DJs 
whose music was transmitted on his cable radio station and his music program was soon 
embraced by its target group in Berlin. However, Marc felt restricted by the limited range 
of  cable radio, and from 1995 onwards, he aimed to broadcast to a wider audience of  
young listeners nationwide. However, this undertaking required an official broadcasting 
license being granted by the German media authorities, who applied very strict criteria. 
Such a move would also have meant that he had to leave behind the familiar underground 
music scene and comply with a highly regulated broadcasting industry. Nevertheless, 
Marc was convinced he would succeed and applied for the license. All the decisions 
in this regard were taken by himself  without consideration of  any internal or external 
concerns. When his concept was not approved by the media authorities on account of  
his lack of  reputation in the broadcasting industry and lack of  financial planning, he and 
his team occupied the offices of  the German media authorities for several days to make 
a stand.
Previous experiences and network. Before embarking on the cable radio venture, Marc had 
launched a venture that organized popular music festivals in Berlin’s underground 
scene. He thus had experience of  venture creation processes and had built an important 
network with crucial players in the underground music scene and with DJs from all 
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over the world. Outside of  the underground scene, however, Marc lacked contacts in 
the highly competitive and regulated German broadcasting industry, which could have 
helped him obtain the official license.
Financing. Marc had received some seed-funding of  around 45,000 USD from his family, 
friends and smaller investors to initiate the radio station and apply for the required 
broadcasting license. The internal documents provided suggest that the business did not 
become profitable until 1998, as he had only vague ideas on how to generate revenues 
in the long run.
Outcome. Marc struggled to secure the required broadcasting license which was crucial 
to the implementation of  his radio station. His occupation of  the media authorities, 
however, led to considerable media coverage that resulted in public discussions regarding 
the issuing practices of  broadcasting licenses. As a consequence of  the public pressure 
generated, the media authorities stopped issuing broadcasting licenses for a couple of  
months. An entrepreneur of  a large German fashion empire, who was also affected by 
these delays, offered Marc a collaboration in return for the cessation of  his protest, which 
was pressurizing the authorities. Marc agreed, secure in the belief  that the collaboration 
would mean that the entrepreneur would apply for two licenses, one for his own business 
and another for Marc’s. However, he failed to sufficiently scrutinize the contractual 
conditions, and whilst he obtained his license, he had lost full control, as all decisions had 
to be taken jointly with his business partner. This situation caused Marc a lot of  frustration 
and, eventually, he left his venture in 1998. Nevertheless, his radio station still exists today 
as it had been taken over by his business partner who realized the considerable market 
potential in Marc’s core idea. To this day, the radio station continues to be quite popular 
with young listeners in Berlin, offering a mixture of  mainstream and DJ music.
Manifestations of  Hubris in ‘Explorative’ Leadership Behaviours
The data indicate that hubristic start-up founders display leadership behaviours of  ‘vi-
sionary perseverance’ and ‘recklessness based on a sense of  invulnerability’ (from here 
on, ‘reckless invulnerability’ for short) during the exploration of  innovation potentials, 
which are captured by the innovation and risk management function. These manifesta-
tions of  hubris entail both beneficial and detrimental aspects for venture creation pro-
cesses. Figure 2 illustrates the findings and contains the emerging data in the adopted 
structure, i.e., first-order concepts, second-order themes, and the higher level aggregate 
dimensions. In Table II, representative first-order data are displayed to illustrate the em-
pirical basis upon which the first-order concepts were developed.
Visionary perseverance (innovation). Various experts have highlighted the ‘visionary power’ of  
hubristic start-up founders ‘who often identify innovation potentials that could possibly disrupt 
existing industries’ (investor, 9 years’ experience[5]) (1). A typical example of  this was 
illustrated by the statement of  a start-up consultant with more than 15 years’ experience, 
who observed that ‘hubristic founders are the ones who question the status quo and really innovate’ 
(start-up consultant, 15 years). Two investors described how they repeatedly negotiated 
with hubris driven founders who envisioned radical innovations with regard to ‘sustainable 
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Table II. Representative data for the manifestations of  hubris on explorative leadership behaviors
Second-order themes and first-order concepts Representative data
Aggregate dimension: Visionary 
Perseverance
1. Insistence on potentially disruptive 
visions
A. Radical rather than incremental 
innovations are envisioned
A1. ‘There was one founder who aimed to establish an entirely 
new goods cycle, actually an entirely new economy based on a 
sustainable currency’ (I, 4 years).
A2. ‘He aimed to develop a very innovative e-government solu-
tion in order to motivate people who are less educated and 
who normally don’t participate in elections’ (I, 6 years).
B. Persistence in the realization of  their 
business ideas
B1. ‘One could probably find a less complex and much simpler 
business idea that would make many things a lot easier. 
However, he wants this idea and nothing else is taken into 
consideration’ (SC, 5 years).
B2. ‘Persistence, persistence, persistence. He didn’t deviate a 
single centimetre from his initial idea’ (I, 16 years).
2. Perceived self-evidence of  value 
proposition
C. Proof-of-concept and validation 
of  value proposition is considered 
unnecessary
C1. ‘They don’t consider what the customers perceive or want’ 
(SC, 5 years).
C2. ‘I am a customer myself  because I currently use the product 
the way it is. Hence, I know how to do it better and every-
body will recognize the benefit immediately’ (SC, 7 years).
D. Alternatives for or adaptations of  
envisioned innovation are neglected
D1. ‘The few customers who already use the application are not 
satisfied and therefore, there is no evident proof-of-concept. 
He knows all of  this, but he doesn’t want to adapt the applica-
tion because he is convinced that the customers just have to 
understand the solution to appreciate it’ (SC, 5 years).
D2. ‘They argue that they know what the solution has to look 
like. Hence, the problem is not the solution, but the customers 
who don’t understand it’ (SC, 5 years).
Aggregate dimension: Reckless 
Invulnerability
3. Negligence of  potential risks and 
emerging problems
E. External risks are neither antici-
pated nor appropriately considered
E1. ‘He always interpreted objectively quantifiable risks in ac-
cordance with own perceptions, which were always perfectly 
fine’ (SC, 11 years).
E2. ‘We were three investors and we all had competitors of  his 
in our portfolios. He didn’t care as he never perceived compe-
tition as competition’ (I, 16 years).
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currencies’ (I, 4 years) and ‘e-government solutions’ (I, 9 years). This drive to create radically 
new – and potentially disruptive – visionary scenarios is also reflected in the cases of  
Carl and Marc, who were both motivated by their ambitions to identify such innovation 
potentials. Carl set out to create ‘something entirely new that would shake up the mobile games 
industry’, while Marc desired ‘to create an entirely new radio format, something that nobody had ever 
seen before’. Especially the investors perceived the visionary power of  hubristic founders 
as highly beneficial for leadership during the venture creation process. Specifically, they 
stated that ‘we need such founders who perceive only the sky as their limit. These are the ones who drive 
innovation in our economy’ (I, 16 years). The hubris-driven belief  that anything is possible 
became particularly evident in the case of  Marc. This founder was able to inspire an 
unwavering commitment among his employees who saw themselves as ‘the Mongols of  the 
radio. Our cavalry occupied territories that others didn’t even guess existed’ (employee of  Marc).
Despite these beneficial manifestations of  hubris for the exploration of  innovation 
potentials, it became also evident that ‘hubristic founders are highly unlikely to ever question their 
business ideas, once they had started realizing them’ (SC, 3 years). Both Carl and Marc insisted 
on their innovative visions without ever seriously considering alternatives. The numer-
ous product presentations and business plans of  ‘DrivingTest’, for instance, indicate that 
Carl’s initial business idea did not change during the entire venture creation process. Even 
when hitting upon obstacles, Carl never took into consideration that ‘it doesn’t work the way 
I imagined’. Marc too faced considerable difficulties but, in his words, his ‘options were death or 
honor, fame or failure, victory or defeat’. Hence, he never questioned his original idea.
As a consequence of  their unshakable belief  in the potential of  their innovative idea, 
hubristic founders seem to take the proof-of-concept of  their business ideas for granted 
Second-order themes and first-order concepts Representative data
F. Negligence of  significant prob-
lems during business model 
implementation
F1. ‘It seems that there wasn’t a single problem, but it took just 
two hours of  market research to realize that his business was 
at risk – high risk’ (I, 11 years).
F2. ‘I always tried to engage him in discussions, but he just 
didn’t want to talk about the problems that occur during the 
implementation process’ (C, 8 years).
4. Perceived resilience drives business 
activities
G. Perception of  being resistant against 
external circumstances
G1. ‘I pointed out that there already were several successful 
competitors on the US-market but the only thing he said was: 
’If  the competitor in the US would have wanted to enter the 
market, he could have done so five years ago’ (SC, 16 years).
G2. ‘Externalities were never reflected’ (I, 9 years).
H. Consideration of  illegal means to 
realize business models at all cost
H1. ‘He always tended to go one step too far. More conservative 
people would say that he pursued illegal actions (SC, 7 years).
H2. ‘Existing laws were interpreted rather loosely when they 
caused difficulties with implementing the business model ac-
cording to his vision’ (C, 9 years).
Table II. Continued
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and the value proposition offered as self-evident (2). One of  the start-up consultants ob-
served that ‘hubristic founders frequently perceive themselves as fully identifying with their own target 
group. Hence, they decide what they like best about their value proposition. Effectively, the solution is then 
developed [in isolation] behind their closed office door’ (SC, 5 years). Their failure to validate or 
reassess the presumed value proposition leads them to ‘disregard customer feedback that does 
not comply with their own visions as they are very, very firmly convinced that all it takes is for the rest of  
the world to recognize how beneficial their idea really is’ (SC, 11 years). Moreover, both Marc and 
Carl stated that they considered their existing industry experience from their previous 
venture creation processes to be sufficient. Marc, for example, thought he knew ‘what was 
going on in the international party scene and what the people wanted to hear’. This made them oblivi-
ous to any customer feedback during the early phase of  his venture creation. Instead, the 
data suggest that hubristic founders tend to perceive negative feedback and even a lack of  
demand ‘as a problem on the customer side’ (C, 4 years). This attitude is exemplarily reflected 
in the narrations of  a start-up consultant who worked with a hubris-driven entrepreneur 
for several months: ‘The founder I accompanied received negative customer feedback such as “The 
application is too complicated. You cannot use it. It needs to be easier”. He simply disagreed and said: 
“They just need more time to understand it”’ (SC, 5 years).
Reckless invulnerability (risk management). One core behaviour of  leaders – especially relevant 
to start-up founders – involves the ability to deal with risk management in the face of  
uncertainty. However, the data suggest that hubristic entrepreneurs are less likely to 
consider internal and external risks as they tend to perceive themselves to be invulnerable 
– regardless of  the consequences. This leads to neglecting potential external risks, such 
as new market regulations or competitors, and internally occurring problems during the 
business model implementation (3). Instead, their perceived resilience seems to drive the 
business activities of  hubristic founders (4). The data suggest that these manifestations 
of  hubris can also have some beneficial impacts on leadership behaviours as hubristic 
founders tend to ‘push ahead instead of  stopping, even in case of  doubt’ (SC, 7 years). One of  
the investors accompanied a hubristic founder who ‘never acknowledged that something didn’t 
work out but always tried to find new opportunities to actually make it work’ (I, 16 years). Marc too 
benefited from this recklessness as he ‘didn’t ever perceive problems but only temporal delays in the 
development of  [his] radio station’.
However, ‘their strong focus on perceived chances and incredible underestimation of  risks’ (C, 
12 years) means that hubris-driven entrepreneurs have a tendency to rarely evaluate and 
tackle risks. In the cases of  Carl and Marc it became evident that both founders ‘subjec-
tively interpreted risks’ (employee of  Marc) and ‘consistently neglected all our concerns with regard to 
the feasibility of  the mobile application’ (Carl’s developer). Carl in particular neglected obvious 
obstacles resulting from the limited net data transmission rates and storage capacities of  
mobile phones, which put the whole start-up at considerable risk: ‘we were running out of  
money as the whole development process took longer and longer. We were facing insolvency and I didn’t 
realize it until my bank called me’.
Interestingly, several experts described experiences with hubristic founders who would 
rather engage in illegal business activities than re-evaluate or abandon their business 
models. One of  the founders ‘pretended to have internal returns that did not exist’ (SC, 11 years), 
whereas another ‘never told his customers that he was selling their personal data’ (C, 6 years). Marc 
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too violated laws when he occupied the media authorities for several days in order to 
raise public awareness.
Manifestations of  Hubris in ‘Exploitative’ Leadership Behaviours
As part of  exploring new business opportunities, start-up founders need to internally and 
externally exploit innovation potentials through performing the internal coordination 
and arbitrage function. Our data indicate that once more hubris is manifested in both 
beneficial and detrimental leadership behaviours in this regard. Specifically, hubristic 
start-up founders are found to display ‘socially potent egocentrism’ when coordinating 
internal exploitation matters, whereas their guidance of  external commercialization ef-
forts is characterized by ‘persuasive unconventionality’. Table III contains all relevant 
first-order data.
Socially potent egocentricity (internal coordination). In terms of  benefitting the internal 
coordination, social potency is often ascribed to hubristic founders, referring to their 
ability to positively influence their employees’ motivation and faith in their vision (Ensley 
et al., 2006; Ensley and Pearson, 2005; Lester et al., 2002). In this regard, they benefit from 
an unshakable belief  in the success of  their targeted business model (5) that leads them 
to actually exploit previously identified innovation potentials in the first place. Various 
experts stated that ‘without hubris, you probably wouldn’t launch a venture in many industries’ (SC, 
4 years). Similar to their belief  in the grandiosity of  their identified innovation potentials, 
‘they are convinced that their business model will doubtlessly succeed in the targeted markets’ (C, 7 years) 
and ‘that this one specific product is going to make a better world’ (I, 11 years). This conviction 
seems to be shared by their employees, who are initially highly motivated in supporting 
the exploitation process. Similarly, staff  employed by Carl and Marc described the ‘magic’ 
and ‘indispensable power’ that emanated from the founders and inspired their teams. Carl’s 
developer stated that ‘Carl projected so much strength and power that nobody in our team ever doubted 
our success. Our success was always so obvious’.
In addition, the data indicate that hubristic entrepreneurs tend to ‘provide their ventures 
with a clear direction’ (SC, 4 years), which enables them to ‘carry others with them’ (I, 16 years) 
(6). Their ability to manage internal processes in a targeted manner can be observed 
particularly in difficult situations, in which the implementation of  the business model is 
at risk. Several experts state that ‘they are able to deal even with extremely difficult situations’ (I, 
16 years) as ‘they don’t make decisions democratically but tell their employees how to deal with the sit-
uation’ (C, 11 years). One highly experienced consultant stated that ‘we had good experiences 
with teams in which one person considerably overestimated him or herself. This person carries others with 
them’ (SC, 17 years). For these reasons, many experts described hubristic entrepreneurs as 
‘highly persuasive’ (I, 11 years) and ‘target-focused’ leaders (SC, 12 years).
Nevertheless, their egocentrism with regard to internal decision-making (7) can also 
cause problems once the initial euphoria among the employees has subsided. In partic-
ular, the data indicate that hubristic entrepreneurs tend to take care of  all crucial tasks 
related to the internal exploitation of  their business idea ‘as they do not trust anybody else to 
have sufficient skills’ (SC, 16 years). One investor described a hubristic founder who was 
even ‘unhealthily obsessed with realizing the business model on his own’ (I, 17 years). Another 
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Table III. Representative data for the manifestations of  hubris on exploitative leadership behaviours
Second-order themes and first-order concepts Representative data
Aggregate dimension: Socially Potent 
Egocentricity
5. Unshakable belief  in the success of  
the targeted business model
I. Perceived grandiosity of  targeted 
business model
I1. ‘Their conviction is triggered by the unshakable belief  that 
their solution is absolutely the best and other offers on the 
market are a joke in comparison’ (SC, 4 years).
I2. ‘He even approached politicians and wrote letters to the 
Prime Minister. He told him that he was offering exceptional 
solutions to the start-up scene and therefore, he deserves 
funding’ (I, 6 years).
J. Unshakable belief  in being able to 
successfully establish their business 
model
J1. ‘There was never a single doubt that his business model 
wouldn’t succeed’ (SC, 15 years).
J2. ‘This belief  and this faith in the business model were just 
incredible’ (C, 9 years).
6. Persuasive and target-oriented guid-
ance for employees
K. Excitement and persuasiveness is 
highly motivational for employees
K1. ‘His employees were highly motivated. They believed him 
and he believed in his business model’ (SC, 5 years).
K2. ‘You should have worked with him. He was persuasive and 
you just believed in every word he said. At least in the begin-
ning’ (employee of  Marc).
L. Targeted decision-making in critical 
situations
L1. ‘They are able to deal even with extremely difficult situa-
tions’ (SC, 5 years).
L2. ‘Thanks to their charisma, these founders can deal with 
extremely difficult situation because they are able to wrap 
employees around their fingers’ (I, 16 years).
7. Egocentrism in internal 
decision-making
M. Core tasks are rarely delegated M1. ‘He wanted to do everything himself, even things that he 
wasn’t capable of  doing’ (SC, 7 years).
M2. ‘He was constantly worried that other people couldn’t 
achieve what he was capable of  achieving’ (SC, 15 years).
N. Own decisions are enforced on 
employees
N1. ‘He always wanted to have the final say, he had to decide 
even when he was wrong (SC, 15 years).
N2. ‘He imagined a complicated approach for the realization 
of  his business idea and his employees told him that this ap-
proach might not be the smartest as the development process 
would consume a lot of  time. One could find a much easier 
solution to realize this application, but he didn’t consider 
these concerns and everybody in the team had to follow’ (SC, 
8 years)
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invested in the project of  a founder who ‘got close to a heart attack. He was working in a team 
of  eight people, but he did everything himself. He got fatter and fatter on his seat, but his employees 
were only allowed to string bits and pieces together. He did all business events and transactions himself ’  
Second-order themes and first-order concepts Representative data
O. Building excessive internal 
structures
O1. ‘Oh boy, you should’ve seen this immense office space and 
the fabulous furniture he bought. It looked great but it was 
just over the top. He never met customers in the office’ (I, 
16 years).
O2. ‘I was overwhelmed by how much he spent on his internal 
structures’ (I, 17 years).
Aggregate dimension: Persuasive 
Unconventionality
8. Persuasiveness and sensationalism in 
dealing with external stakeholders
P. Persuasive initiation of  strategic 
partnerships with external stakehold-
ers that support commercialization 
efforts
P1. ‘People who didn’t know him well just couldn’t wait to 
support his commercialization efforts. It is incredible how he 
managed to convince people. Listening to him, it all sound 
brilliant and leaves you in no doubt that he will pull it off ’ 
(SC, 15 years)
P2. ‘He succeeded again and again to attract smaller investors 
who provided money for his crazy marketing campaign. The 
way he talked was always very charismatic’ (C, 6 years).
Q. Undertaking sensational marketing 
efforts
Q1. ‘The media were full of  how we occupied the media au-
thorities’ (employee of  Marc).
Q2. ‘He branded a whole building in the city centre with their 
logo and message. He never got permission to do so but the 
media went crazy about it’ (SC, 8 years).
9. Insistence on unaligned commer-
cialization strategies
R. Negligence of  experts’ feedback re-
garding commercialization strategies
R1. ‘He never listened. He just never listened. Two investors 
and two highly experienced entrepreneurs pointed out that 
his commercialization strategy would not work out. He didn’t 
heed any of  their concerns’ (I, 16 years).
R2. ’He never wanted to discuss commercialization matters 
but we should’ve read his contract. He even discussed with 
me but never seriously considered my feedback. Never’ (I, 
17 years).
S. Commercialization strategies exceed 
own capabilities and are not aligned 
to market conditions
S1. ‘It would have been easy to take a look at how competi-
tors approach the market. It was obvious that the customers 
wouldn’t buy the product in the supermarket, but that’s what 
he wanted’ (SC, 4 years).
S2. ‘He had no idea how to do online marketing. He was a 
mathematician. A genius mathematician. He had never heard 
about SEO and these things’ (SC, 16 years).
Table III. Continued
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(I, 11 years). Similarly, Carl’s developer described how the internal concerns of  the team 
with regard to the technical feasibility of  the mobile application were ignored: ‘It took us 
considerably longer than initially estimated to develop our app due to limited storage capacities and data 
transmission rates. These obstacles weren’t surprising, but Carl never considered our concerns’. Instead, 
the experts agreed that hubristic founders tend to follow the credo ‘think as big as you can’ 
(SC, 17 years). This seems to be generally favourable to the venture creation process as 
‘the bigger you think, the bigger it might get’ (SC, 8 years) but it was also observed that ‘they often 
think big but without thinking it through’ (SC, 4 years). One of  the coaches explained how 
a hubristic founder ‘rented a far too large gas station, ordered more and more machines, and all of  
this without any plan or calculations’ (C, 11 years). In the same vein, Carl rented large office 
spaces and bought an expensive vehicle fleet for his start-up. Eventually, he and his team 
‘had to lay off  employees, leave our big and nice office, and sell a bunch of  cars, all of  which was a 
disaster’ (Carl).
Persuasive unconventionality (arbitrage). As with the internal coordination, the manifestations 
of  hubris in leadership behaviours that foster the external exploitation of  identified 
innovation potentials are equally ambivalent. On the one hand, hubristic founders seem 
to be highly persuasive in terms of  securing commitment from external stakeholders 
that are relevant to the commercialization of  their products and services. On the other 
hand, they insist on commercialization strategies that are not necessarily aligned to the 
conditions of  the target market.
In terms of  benefits, hubristic start-up founders are characterized by many experts as 
‘excellent sales persons’ (I, 11 years) as they are ‘highly authentic and persuasive in the communication 
with external parties’ (SC, 16 years) (8). Their appeal seems to support them particularly in 
the execution of  leadership behaviours related to securing commitment in terms of  ex-
ternal capital from investors, who similarly have described hubristic founders as ‘friendly 
people, they often look good, they know how to talk, and they convince you in a manner that you feel super 
comfortable’ (I, 17 years). Interestingly, even highly experienced investors were unable to 
rationally explain why they invested in the business of  hubristic founders. Instead, one in-
vestor described how he was ‘captured by their nature and I often wonder how these people succeeded 
to convince me’ (I, 21 years), and another investor admitted that ‘from a rational point-of-view, 
I cannot explain why I unconditionally believed in them’ (I, 11 years). Similar evidence can be 
found in the case of  Carl, who succeeded in his negotiations with Vodafone. As a result, 
he was able to sell his mobile application at a ‘price point of  9.99 USD in the games stores. This 
price didn’t exist before’. His employee was part of  these negotiations and described them as 
‘lengthy and difficult as we never got a single sign that Vodafone was actually considering our claim. But 
Carl was astonishing. With his persuasive attitude he convincingly demonstrated again and again that the 
commercialization of  our app at a higher price point would open up completely new avenues. And he just 
didn’t give up’. Many of  the experts described the commercialization efforts of  hubristic 
founders as ‘sensational’ (SC, 7 years) and ‘unconventional’ (SC, 12 years). Marc, for instance, 
succeeded to guide the commercialization efforts of  his team towards unconventional 
guerrilla-marketing campaigns that involved the occupation of  the media authorities for 
several days.
Nevertheless, the data also indicate that hubristic founders tend to insist on commer-
cialization strategies that are not aligned to their overall strategy or to their target market 
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(9). Internal documents provided by Carl and Marc indicate that both considerably un-
derestimated commercialization matters and assessed the market only in a superficial 
manner. This behaviour impaired their guidance of  their teams towards the develop-
ment of  efficient long-term commercialization efforts, as also reflected in the narrative of  
various start-up consultants. One of  them accompanied a new venture founder and his 
team who ‘never reflected how they could even generate the first customers and how they could finance 
their acquisition. Instead, they anticipated that, “once we reach two million customers, we are going to sell 
their data to Google and use advertisements to finance ourselves”’ (SC, 8 years). Crucially, hubristic 
founders seem to mostly ignore external expert feedback on the issues of  commercial-
ization. Various experts experienced that they were ‘hardly allowed to ask critical questions in 
relation to their commercialization strategies’ (SC, 7 years).
Overall, the data suggest that hubris facilitates the initiation of  strategic partnerships 
with external stakeholders but impairs the guidance of  employees towards the develop-
ment of  long-term commercialization efforts as hubristic founders seem to pay insuffi-
cient heed to external market conditions.
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
Theoretical implications
Our findings allow us to derive several theoretical contributions to the literature on entre-
preneurial leadership, particularly to studies on the effectiveness of  hubristic leadership. 
First and foremost, we broaden the scope of  the hubris tradition of  research by overcom-
ing the ‘negative-negative paradigm’ (Bollaert and Petit, 2010, p. 363) of  research on hu-
bristic leadership and by challenging the inherent association of  hubris with detrimental 
leadership outcomes (Bollaert and Petit, 2010; Judge et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2015b). We 
argue that this predetermined view of  hubris as a purely ‘dark’ psychological disposi-
tion neglects crucial advances in existing literature. It disregards well-established findings 
from personality psychology indicating that the personality dimensions characteristic for 
hubris have, like any other personality trait, both upsides and downsides (Furnham et al., 
2012; Nettle, 2006; Resick et al., 2009), and it neglects contradictory empirical evidence 
generated by Tang et al. (2015a) who were a considerable inspiration for the study we 
conducted. Following their findings on hubris as a driver of  firm innovation, we started 
our research by tracing the cases of  Elon Musk, Steve Jobs and Dean Kamen. These 
cases suggested that the ambivalent manifestations of  hubris are particularly observable 
in leadership behaviours of  start-up founders who operate under conditions that entail 
only low impediments to leadership (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Ensley et al., 2006; 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). To the best of  our knowledge, we are among the first 
to provide rich empirical evidence for the ambivalent manifestations of  hubris in start-up 
founders’ leadership behaviours.
Our research provides a first scholarly response to the prevailing criticism that the 
hubris tradition of  research tends to only ‘look at some trees and miss the whole forest’ 
(Picone et al., 2014, p. 448). With our approach and findings, we open up several ave-
nues for future research and, perhaps even more importantly, equip scholars aiming to 
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contribute to the hubris tradition of  research with a strong argument to look for both 
positive and negative manifestations of  hubris in leadership behaviours. We know from 
our own experience of  presenting and discussing prior versions of  our work how diffi-
cult it is to overcome the predominantly negative connotation of  hubris across various 
research disciplines. Nevertheless, our findings clearly indicate that more impartial and 
nuanced examinations are needed to relieve the tensions between the widespread associ-
ation of  hubris with suboptimal behaviour and the observation that hubristic leadership 
nonetheless persists (Bollaert and Petit, 2010; Judge et al., 2009; Picone et al., 2014).
As one of  the reasons for the persistence of  hubristic leadership, we found that hubris 
is a contributor to leadership emergence in start-up contexts. In particular, we found that 
it equips start-up founders with the necessary courage to persistently exploit identified 
innovation potentials despite the considerable likeliness of  venture failure. These insights 
are also reflected in the hubris theory of  entrepreneurship by Hayward et al. (2006) 
which we are able to extend by showing that the ‘bright’ effects of  hubris can be found 
well beyond the emergence of  start-up founders. Our findings indicate that hubristic 
entrepreneurs are also successful in performing crucial leadership behaviours, partic-
ularly those involving the creation of  visionary scenarios, guiding employees in critical 
situations, and securing commitment from third parties. Whilst hubristic founders might 
be likely to fail overall, we show that ‘such failure is not necessarily bad for ventures and 
entrepreneurial activity’ (Hayward et al., 2006, p. 170).
Given the ambivalent implications of  hubristic leadership across different levels of  
analysis, future research is well advised to take a closer look at its boundary conditions. 
For instance, our findings suggest that the particular type of  leadership behaviour of  
hubristic founders accounts for the observed ambivalences. According to the outcomes 
of  our study, hubristic leaders are particularly well suited to explore innovation potentials 
that are likely to trigger processes of  ‘creative destruction’ in the Schumpeterian sense, 
which involves the performance of  leadership behaviours for which outcomes are highly 
uncertain to predict (Bollaert and Petit, 2010; Judge et al., 2009). These findings indicate 
that hubris is particularly beneficial in earlier stages of  the venture creation process. 
Still, future research is required to gain a more fine-grained and longitudinal perspective 
on the manifestations of  hubris and to specify the boundary conditions that divide the 
presumably thin line between beneficial and detrimental manifestations of  hubris in ex-
plorative and exploitative leadership behaviours. Relevant research questions are: How 
do hubristic leaders fare over the long term? How do the dark and bright manifestations 
of  hub leaders play out over the long term?
In addition, we recommend that contextual conditions need to be taken into consider-
ation in order to strengthen theories on hubristic leadership. In our study, we focused on 
the start-up context and provided a detailed discussion of  its specificities, and concluded 
that hubristic leadership only entailed low impediments to the start-ups investigated. 
The findings by Tang et al. (2015b) indicate that some of  the beneficial manifestations 
of  hubris we found in our analysis are also likely to occur in contexts of  more mature 
and established organizations. We acknowledge their findings but argue that, compared 
to start-ups, the organizational climate in established organizations is less conducive to 
such leaders acting out their innovative visions, thus, limiting the extent to which hubris 
is manifested in core leadership behaviours in this context (Chesbrough, 2010). In spite 
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of  these differences, it is crucial to determine contextual conditions as moderators of  
hubris’ manifestations in order to design suitable governance measures able to mitigate 
detrimental outcomes of  hubristic leadership while encouraging beneficial ones. To date, 
literature still lacks comparative studies that examine which type of  governance struc-
tures can deal more effectively with hubristic leaders across contexts.
Monitoring measures might be especially suitable to overseeing the internal and ex-
ternal exploitation of  identified innovation potentials for which hubristic founders are 
found to display ‘socially potent egocentrism’ in coordinating internal exploitation mat-
ters, whereas their approach towards external commercialization efforts is characterized 
by ‘persuasive unconventionality’. Social potency refers to the ability to inspire and mo-
tivate employees (Ensley et al., 2006; Ensley and Pearson, 2005; Lester et al., 2002) to 
the point where they share with their leader an unshakable belief  in the inevitability of  
the future success of  their business model. This finding is rather new to the hubris tra-
dition of  research but similar assumptions are also reflected in the previously discussed 
‘hubris hypothesis of  corporate takeovers’ by Roll (1986). Similar to decision-makers in 
M&A processes, hubristic start-up founders are also likely to overestimate their ability 
to extract extraordinary values from identified innovation potentials. Nevertheless, this 
hubris-driven belief  seems to be primarily beneficial in start-up contexts. Specifically, our 
data indicate that the hubristic founders’ unshakable belief  in their inevitable success pos-
itively influences the internal motivation among their employees who are thus persuaded 
to support the exploitation processes. Nevertheless, these beneficial manifestations of  
hubris seem to fade once the initial euphoria among their employees has subsidized, and 
they come to realize that the founder rarely gives due consideration to their concerns and 
ideas. The hubris-driven persuasiveness in fostering the internal motivation among their 
employees is also reflected in the founders’ ability to secure commitment from external 
stakeholders that could support commercialization efforts. Especially investors seem to 
be persuaded by the charisma of  hubristic founders, which surprisingly appears to be of  
greater importance to their investment decisions than rational arguments. Given that this 
external perception of  hubristic start-up founders has so far been neglected in the hubris 
tradition of  research, it provides interesting avenues for future research, as discussed 
below.
The Janus face of  hubris, with its ‘bright’ and ‘dark’ manifestations, has emerged 
as a result of  our holistic and impartial examinations of  hubris across core leadership 
behaviours. The theoretical framework we have developed for this purpose allows fu-
ture research to systematically examine core leadership behaviours that guide the ex-
ploration and exploitation of  innovation potentials in start-up contexts: (1) innovation 
(Schumpeter, 1934), (2) risk management (Knight, 1921), (3) internal coordination (Cole, 
1949; Gartner, 1988), and (4) arbitrage (Kirzner, 1973; Mises, 1949). Our framework 
specifies the scope of  leadership behaviours affected by hubris and can therefore be 
used to inform future research concerned with providing more holistic knowledge in this 
regard. It could be used, for instance, as an extension to the ‘conceptual map of  mana-
gerial hubris research’ by Picone et al. (2014), by providing a holistic perspective on the 
implications of  hubris for what the scholars label the ‘hubris-driven strategic choices’ 
that managers must make. In addition, the framework could inform related research on 
entrepreneurial leadership, without necessarily focusing on personality traits.
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Practical Implications
These findings and contributions carry manifold practical implications for hubristic 
start-up founders and stakeholders who are affected by the implications of  hubristic 
leadership, including employees, investors, consultants, and coaches. Although it seems 
quite difficult to guide hubristic entrepreneurs, we agree with de Vries (1990) that ‘help is 
needed to recognize the distortions of  reality. Someone is needed to point out the symp-
toms of  hubris’ (p. 7). Therefore, we recommend educating upcoming start-up founders 
and their potential stakeholders about hubris and its ‘bright’ as well as ‘dark’ manifesta-
tions across core leadership behaviours. Reflections about how personality traits could 
affect venture creation processes should become an integral part of  entrepreneurship 
training programs offered by universities, start-up associations and other institutions that 
provide guidance for (upcoming) start-up founders. In addition, it has been found that 
exploring case studies of  leaders in comparable positions is a powerful means of  catalys-
ing personal reflections on own behaviours and strategic choices (Schedlitzki et al., 2015). 
Hence, studying behaviours of  other hubristic founders might trigger a certain degree 
of  reflexivity that enables dealing with them more effectively to mitigate detrimental 
outcomes while not stymying beneficial behaviours.
Our data indicate that practitioners need to be firm with hubristic entrepreneurs, and 
to play devil’s advocate by encouraging them to defend their ideas and strategies. Several 
of  the consultants and investors interviewed stated that they require their founders to 
regularly reflect their strategic choices in light of  the milestones achieved and the chal-
lenges encountered along the way. On the basis of  such regular updates, practitioners are 
able to provide honest feedback and monitor the responsiveness of  the founders facing 
potentially harmful risks. If  the founders fail to respond, the experts suggested pointing 
out extreme scenarios of  potential consequences, which is an ‘institutionalized way of  
reminding the power holder of  the transience of  [their] position’ (de Vries, 1990, p. 8), 
as an often times efficient way to trigger self-reflections in hubristic entrepreneurs. As 
long as this intervention does not lead to any change in behaviour, investors in particu-
lar should consider “to use pressure and threaten them with potential sanctions. If  this 
doesn’t work and they don’t change their mind, you should abandon the collaboration 
before it is too late’ (I, 16 years).
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities
Despite the carefully chosen research design and analytical approach, our study has 
several limitations and opens up questions that should be addressed in future research. 
First, we determined hubris through third parties who brought extensive experience of  
working with start-up founders, and who we assumed were able to distinguish hubris-
tic from non-hubristic behaviour. However, we were not able to additionally determine 
the self-assessments of  the founders in this regard, and our validity checks required the 
involvement of  scholars from different disciplines. It is important to point out that the 
validity of  the CSE scale which we adopted for triangulating our data, has not been sup-
ported by any rigorous empirical examination in the literature to date. In other words, its 
underpinning assumption, which posits a correlation between ‘extraordinarily high levels 
of  CSE’ – deemed to be an enduring disposition – and hubris, a temporary psychological 
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disposition, remains unsupported. Therefore, we would encourage future research to 
develop methods that can facilitate how hubris is captured through a combination of  
both self  and peer-assessments, particularly in qualitative research designs. Such meth-
ods would also enable an extension of  our findings through more fine-grained analyses, 
investigating distinct research questions, such as why hubristic leaders act the way they 
do, how variations in the outcomes of  hubristic leadership can be explained, and how 
hubristic start-up founders and executives are perceived by third parties in specific situa-
tions, such as raising capital, extracting employee commitment or initiating new projects. 
In addition, a thorough conceptualization of  hubris would allow for a comparison of  the 
behaviours of  hubristic and non-hubristic leaders. We have focused on hubristic start-up 
founders to gain a deeper understanding of  how their hubris is manifested across core 
leadership behaviours and have deliberately designed an exploratory study to generate 
answers to this question. Nevertheless, our data does not allow to compare their be-
haviours with that of  non-hubristic leaders, and future comparative studies are needed 
to clearly contrast manifestations of  hubris from non-hubristic behaviours.
Second, the underlying conceptualization suggests that hubris is a temporary psycho-
logical disposition that diminishes when power fades. Little is known, however, about 
variations in the level of  hubris during the venture creation process. As our study was 
not designed to investigate such variations, future research could address this limitation 
and find out whether any distinct moderators can be detected that influence variations 
in hubris and its influence on venture performance at different life-cycle stages. Thirdly, 
the interpretation of  our empirical data was highly dependent upon our theoretical per-
spective and framework. Hence, our findings only depict one possible perspective on the 
data. The application of  distinct perspectives and frameworks in future research projects 
is likely to foster theory development through additional insights on the manifestations of  
hubris in leadership behaviours. Particularly interesting in this regard are examinations 
on the transferability of  our findings to the manifestations of  hubris on executives’ lead-
ership behaviours in established organizations. Furthermore, our study remains silent on 
gender aspects, but our data clearly indicate that particularly male start-up founders tend 
to be driven by hubris. Future research might find interesting insights on gender-specific 
triggers of  hubris and differences in the approaches of  mixed teams and unisex teams to 
dealing with hubristic leaders.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have moved towards a more fine-grained and comprehensive under-
standing of  how hubris is manifested in leadership behaviours that guide the exploration 
and exploitation of  innovation potentials in start-up contexts. We have built our work 
on a theoretical framework that draws upon classical economic and entrepreneurship 
theorizing. This framework allows us to comprehensively explore the ‘bright’ and ‘dark’ 
manifestations of  start-up founders’ hubris in core leadership behaviours. Our empirical 
analysis was based upon data from narratives of  experts, who directly interact with new 
venture founders on a regular basis, and two case studies of  hubristic founders. While 
there is a growing amount of  research on entrepreneurial leadership, impartial research 
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on how distinct psychological dispositions, particularly hubris, affect start-up founders’ 
effectiveness remains still limited. As such, our research represents a valuable step for-
ward, whilst further investigations are needed to foster theory development in this regard. 
Future research endeavours could benefit from this research and inform current and 
future entrepreneurial leaders to recognize distortions of  reality that can be detrimental 
to the successful realization of  their far-fetched ideas.
NOTES
[1] Elon Musk (2018). Q&A Session at the SXSW Conference. 11 March 2018, Austin.
[2] Steve Jobs (2011). Steve Jobs: One Last Thing, Video Documentary.
[3] Dean Kamen (2016). Speech at the 5th Forbes 400 Summit on Philanthropy. 8 July 2016, New York.
[4] By drawing on dual-process theory, Claxton et al. (2015) discuss how hubristic leaders are exposed to 
the ‘perils of  unbridled intuition’ as they focus their information processing extensively on intuition 
(system 1) rather than on the analysis of  rational arguments and actual conditions (system 2).
[5] For ease of  identification of  interviewees, investors are indicated by the letter I, start-up consultants 
with SC, and coaches with C, all followed by the number of  years of  experience of  working with 
founders.
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